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ABSTRACT-This article considers whether state constitutionalism provides greater possibilities for work-
place religious accommodation than is currently available to religious minorities within federal law under Title 
VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. We approach this question via a case study of the controversy over religious 
accommodation for practicing Muslims employed by the JBS Swift and Company meatpacking plant in Grand 
Island, N E. The case study consists of analyses of the requirements for religious accommodation under federal 
law, examination ofthe reasons why religious accommodation under federal law was not achieved in the Grand 
Island case, and analysis of Nebraska constitutional law on the subject of religious free exercise. We find that the 
language in the Nebraska Constitution regarding protection of religious practice provides grounds for Muslims 
and other religious minorities in Nebraska to seek religious accommodations in the workplace through state 
government venues that they have been unable to achieve under federal law. 
Key Words: accommodation, free exercise of religion, Muslims, Nebraska, state constitutionalism, Title VII, 
workplace 
INTRODUCTION 
This article considers whether state constitutional-
ism provides greater possibilities for workplace religious 
accommodation than is currently available to religious 
minorities within federal law under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. In matters pertaining to pluralism, 
particularly religious pluralism, the dominant approach 
is to examine federal law and the U.S. Constitution for 
guidance. But while the parameters of our constitutional 
rights are set by federal authorities, the states may provide 
broader protections to these basic rights under their own 
constitutions, provided that they do not offend against the 
U.S. Constitution. For this reason, state law has a vital 
role to play in resolving tensions between majoritarian-
ism on the one hand, and the values of religious pluralism 
and liberty on the other. 
We approach this question via a case study of the 
controversy over religious accommodation for practicing 
Muslims employed by the JBS Swift and Company meat-
packing plant in Grand Island, NE. First, we summarize 
the facts of the Grand Island case. Second, we consider 
the federal requirements for religious accommodation. 
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Third, we examine how religious accommodation for the 
Muslim employees at the plant was framed by the news 
media and public opinion. Fourth, we examine two com-
peting constitutional frameworks for resolving tensions 
between economic interests and fundamental rights. 
Finally, we consider whether Nebraska's state constitu-
tion provides a suitable framework to secure religious 
liberty. 
CASE BACKGROUND 
Often short of laborers, packinghouses offer employ-
ment opportunities to a diverse array of new settlers, in-
cluding practicing Muslims from Somalia. The JBS Swift 
and Company meatpacking plant in Grand Island, NE, 
became the locus for tensions between Muslim employ-
ees, predominantly Somali refugees, and other employees 
over religious accommodations that the Muslim employ-
ees sought in September 2008 during their holy month of 
Ramadan. 
After hundreds of Muslim employees at the Grand 
Island plant staged a walk-out in protest for break time in 
which to pray, representatives of the Muslim employees 
negotiated an agreement with the plant managers and the 
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workers' union, United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union Local 22, to move the dinner break for workers 
on the evening B-shift 15 minutes earlier so the Muslim 
employees could pray and break their daylong fast shortly 
after sunset. The announced agreement provoked a much 
larger counterprotest by other workers, including Cau-
casian, Latino, and Christian Sudanese employees. The 
counterprotesters complained about favoritism toward 
the Muslim workers. The walk-out by the counterprotest-
ers led to a temporary plant shutdown. The agreement 
with the Muslim employees was subsequently withdrawn, 
leading some ofthe Muslim workers to again walk off the 
job or quit in protest. According to the workers' union, 86 
employees, mostly Muslim, were fired due to unauthor-
ized absences from work during the controversy. 
The need for workers seems to suggest that the meat-
packing industry is willing to accommodate the religious 
requirements of its employees. Meatpacking is physically 
demanding and dangerous work (Nebraska Appleseed 
Center 2009). The nature of the work shapes the boundar-
ies of accommodation, because the workers on shift must 
take their breaks all at the same time. The accommoda-
tion negotiated in the Grand Island case entailed a change 
in the work schedule that affected all employees on the 
shift, not just the Muslim employees. Although the man-
agement and the union were willing to make the change, 
the other employees resented being forced to a change 
they did not seek or desire. The other workers' refusal to 
agree to the change made the accommodation impossible 
and caused hardship to the plant in work stoppage, reduc-
tions in personnel, and verbal altercations between the 
opposing groups that disrupted plant operations. 
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW 
Freedom of religion under federal law is protected by 
the First Amendment. Its two clauses focus on comple-
mentary aspects of religious liberty, for the establishment 
clause seeks to define the limits on government's activi-
ties pertaining to religion, while the free-exercise clause 
seeks to define the extent of the individual's right to reli-
gious practice. The issue of workplace religious accom-
modation lies along the intersection ofthese two aspects 
of religious liberty, raising such questions as these: How 
far does the individual's right of religious free exercise 
extend into the workplace? How far may the government 
go in obliging private employers to accommodate the reli-
gious practices of their employees? In regulating religious 
accommodation in the workplace, does the government 
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entangle itself so extensively in the policing of religious 
belief and practice that the result is an establishment of 
religion? In order to understand the context for religious 
accommodation under Title VII, we first must understand 
the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of the establish-
ment and free-exercise clauses. We turn now to a brief 
consideration of the relevant First Amendment case law. 
In defining the extent of the right to free exercise of 
religion, the Court applied a compelling interest test in 
Sherbert v. Verner (374 U.S. 398 [1963]). The petitioner 
in the case, Ms. Adeil Sherbert, was denied unemploy-
ment compensation after being discharged from her job 
for refusal to work on Saturday, the day of Sabbath in 
the Seventh-Day Adventist Church of which she was a 
member. The Court ruled that the state of South Carolina 
imposed a burden on Ms. Sherbert's exercise of her faith 
with its restrictive qualifications for unemployment ben-
efits, and that such a burden could only be justified by a 
compelling state interest achieved by narrowly tailored 
means; the Court found that no compelling state interest 
was present in Ms. Sherbert's case. The Sherbert rule was 
used subsequently in several additional cases in which 
state unemployment benefits were denied to employees 
who were terminated over conflicts between their work 
responsibilities and their religious beliefs (Thomas v. Re-
view Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 
450 U.S. 707 [1981]; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 [1987]; Frazee v. 
Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 
829 [1989]). 
The Sherbert compelling-interest test was transformed 
into a test for intentional discrimination in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith (494 U.S. 872 [1990]). In the Smith case, two Native 
Americans were denied unemployment compensation 
after being discharged from their jobs for use of peyote in 
their church's religious rituals. The use of peyote was il-
legal under Oregon state law, even for religious purposes. 
The Court found that a generally applicable law, such as 
Oregon's drug law, was valid despite the burden that it 
may place on an individual's religious practices, as long 
as the law did not intentionally discriminate based on 
religion. So whereas under Sherbert, incidental burdens 
on religious free-exercise were deemed unconstitutional 
unless the means were narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest, since Smith, incidental burdens 
on religious free-exercise are permissible; only religious 
bigotry made into law violates the U.S. Constitution. 
As Duncan (2005:1185-86) has observed, the Smith 
Court "transformed" rather than overturned the precedent 
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in Sherbert. For example, if a state permits unemploy-
ment compensation based on an individualized evalua-
tion of whether the applicant had "good cause" to refuse 
work, to deny benefits to an applicant who refused work 
for religious reasons is to demonstrate intolerance for reli-
gion. Thus the law defining eligibility for unemployment 
benefits would be neither neutral nor generally applicable, 
and so subject to strict scrutiny. Duncan believes that the 
Smith ruling holds promise for religious-liberty petitions 
against "public schools, state universities, governmental 
employers, and state agencies. [Because w]herever there 
are rules in government schools and bureaucracies, there 
is almost always a process for seeking a discretionary 
waiver of (or exemption from) those rules" (Duncan 
2005:1187-88). When government agents are given dis-
cretion in the granting of exemptions, a paramount ques-
tion will arise as to whether religious bases for seeking 
exemptions are considered equally with secular bases. 
The principle that the government is to maintain 
neutrality regarding religion is central to jurisprudence 
on the establishment clause. The controlling case for 
establishment issues is Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 
602 [1971]). The Court's opinion in that case developed a 
three-pronged test to determine religious establishment, 
now called the "Lemon Test." To pass constitutional 
muster, actions of government must (1) have a secular 
purpose; (2) in their principal effect, neither advance nor 
inhibit religion; and (3) not create "excessive entangle-
ment" between government and religion. The challenge 
for religious-accommodation statutes lies in the third 
prong ofthe Lemon Test, since it is possible that scrutiniz-
ing the faith of those requesting accommodation in order 
to determine whether the request is legitimate might cross 
the line into "excessive" entanglement of the government 
into religious matters. In the Lemon case itself, state laws 
providing financial aid to church-affiliated schools to 
support the instruction of secular subjects were deemed 
unconstitutional, due in part to the excessive entangle-
ment into the church's business that was expected from 
the state's need to ensure that its money was spent as the 
statute prescribed. 
The requirement for employers to provide religious 
accommodation to their employees derives from Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was clari-
fied by the 1972 amendments to Title VII, particularly 
Section 701U). Reasonable religious accommodation is 
mandated, unless it would create "undue hardship on the 
conduct of the employer's business" (42 U.S.C. 2000eU) 
[1970 ed. Supp. V]). The exact parameters of the protec-
tion for religious belief, practice, or observance remain 
uncertain, because the legislature provided little guid-
ance on what constituted "reasonable" accommodation 
or what hardships should be regarded as "undue." 
The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted undue hardship 
expansively in TransWorld Airlines v. Hardison (432 
U.S. 63 [1977]). In denying religious accommodation to 
a TransWorld Airline (TWA) employee whose religious 
beliefs forbade him to work on Saturday, his religion's 
day of Sabbath, the Court found that it would constitute 
an undue hardship for TWA to circumvent a seniority 
system that was part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment with the employees' union in order to assign an-
other employee to work Mr. Hardison's Saturday shift. 
The Court stated: 
It was essential to TWA's business to require 
Saturday and Sunday work from at least a few 
employees even though most employees pre-
ferred those days off .... [T]o give Hardison 
Saturdays off, TWA would have had to deprive 
another employee of his shift preference at least 
in part because he did not adhere to a religion 
that observed the Saturday Sabbath. (80-81) 
So in the Court's estimation, Hardison's religious require-
ment to keep the Sabbath carried no additional weight or 
force than the nonreligious reasons that other employees 
had for wishing to have Saturdays off. 
Central to the Court's reasoning in TWA v. Hardison 
was a concern about "unequal treatment of employees on 
the basis of their religion" (84). As the quotation above 
makes clear, the Court viewed it as unreasonable for 
another employee to be required to work a Saturday shift 
against his/her preferences in Hardison's place. To rein-
force the point, Justice White ends the Court's opinion as 
follows: "[W]e will not readily construe the [Title VII] 
statute to require an employer to discriminate against 
some employees in order to enable others to observe 
their Sabbath" (85). Based on the reasoning the Court 
employed in this case, it appears that any accommoda-
tion that affects another employee may be deemed un-
reasonable; an exception would be if the accommodation 
involved finding another employee to volunteer to swap 
shifts (81). 
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in TWA v. 
Hardison, finds the Court's lack of concern for religious 
pluralism troubling. He challenges the Court's deter-
mination that it is impermissible for an employer to al-
locate privileges on the basis of an employee's religious 
beliefs: 
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The accommodation issue by definition arises 
only when a neutral rule of general applica-
bility conflicts with the religious practices of 
a particular employee. . . . [T]he question is 
whether the employee is to be exempt from the 
rule's demand. To do so will always result in 
a privilege being "allocated according to reli-
gious beliefs," ante, at 85, unless the employer 
gratuitously decides to repeal the rule in toto. 
(87-88) 
Implicit in Marshall's dissent is a complaint that the 
Court interprets the requirements of accommodation too 
narrowly. It follows that, if employers are not required to 
exempt employees from generally applicable workplace 
rules in order to accommodate religion, then employees 
like Mr. Hardison are forced to choose between their jobs 
and their faith. 
Although the language of Title VII seemingly would 
require employers to bear some hardships, just not "un-
due" ones, the Court's holding in TWA v. Hardison blurs 
to the point of erasing this distinction. In its reversal of 
the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court also re-
futes the appeals court's suggested means of providing 
accommodation to Mr. Hardison, including permitting 
him to work a four-day week or paying premium wages 
to another employee to incentivize volunteers to work the 
less-desirable Saturday shift. In rejecting these options 
as unreasonable, the Court stated: "Both ofthese alterna-
tives would involve costs to TWA, either in the form of 
lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages" (84). The 
Court's reasoning suggests that any additional costs for 
TWA constitute an undue hardship. 
The Court's interpretation of the reasonableness and 
undue hardship standards under Title VII is of course 
reflected in the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's (EEOC) compliance manual on religious 
discrimination. The compliance manual instructs on the 
undue hardship standard as follows: accommodation 
creates an undue hardship "where the accommodation 
diminishes efficiency in other jobs, infringes on other 
employees' job rights or benefits, impairs workplace 
safety, or causes co-workers to carry the accommodated 
employee's share of potentially hazardous or burdensome 
work" (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
2008). The EEOC explicates undue hardship in the con-
text of scheduling changes and shift swapping as follows: 
"it would pose an undue hardship to require employees 
involuntarily to substitute for one another or swap shifts, 
[however] the reasonable accommodation requirement 
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can often be satisfied without undue hardship where 
a volunteer with substantially similar qualifications is 
available to cover" (Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission n.d., "Questions and Answers," emphasis in 
original). Following the Court's direction, the EEOC has 
defined any involuntary change in work scheduling in 
order to accommodate the religious needs of an employee 
to be an undue hardship on the employer. 
A Freedom ofInformation Act request to the St. Louis 
district office of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission produced the following information regard-
ing Title VII complaints about religious discrimination 
in the state of Nebraska. Between October 1, 2003, 
and September 30, 2009, there were 358 allegations of 
religious discrimination made to the Nebraska Equal 
Opportunity Commission and 178 formal charges were 
filed. Eighty-six of the charges are still open, and 92 have 
been closed. Of the closed charges, 88 were closed by a 
no-cause finding being issued, one was an administrative 
closure, two were closed because the complaining party 
withdrew or failed to cooperate, and one was closed by 
issuance of a Notice of a Right to Sue, which indicates 
that the complaining party was given permission to file a 
lawsuit against their employer but that the EEOC found 
an insufficient basis to pursue the claim. These statistics 
demonstrate that complaints about religious discrimina-
tion against Nebraska employers nearly always resolve 
in favor of the employer, in keeping with the expansive 
interpretation of undue hardship that the Court and EEOC 
employ. It is important to recognize that overall, few 
Title VII charges are resolved in the complaining party's 
favor. The EEOC's national statistics for fiscal year 2009 
report that, of the 68,710 charges filed, less than one in 
five (19.9%) were closed with a favorable outcome for the 
complaining party (merit resolutions) (Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission n.d., Title VII charges). 
No doubt some of the other 80.1% of charges genuinely 
were without merit, but the test used to weigh these charg-
es also clearly favors the employer. 
Prenkert and Magid (2006) develop what they term a 
"Hobson's choice model" as a framework for determin-
ing how religion should be accommodated. Their model 
prescribes a review to establish the sincerity of the em-
ployee's religious belief, practice, or observance. It also 
prescribes that the employer produces concrete evidence 
of undue hardship. Under their framework, a reasonable 
accommodation would weigh the evidence of hardship 
against the evidence of the significance of religion to the 
employee. The difficulty with such a balancing test is that 
hardship for the employer could be easily quantified in 
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economic terms, while the religious sincerity of the em-
ployee or the consequences to the employee of violating 
the tenets of his or her religion in order to meet obliga-
tions of employment would be difficult or impossible to 
quantify. This disparity makes it unlikely that "weighing" 
hardship against sincerity could produce predictable pro-
tections for workers seeking religious accommodation. In 
addition, as previously mentioned, an attempt to evaluate 
the employee's sincerity may run afoul of the third prong 
of the Lemon Test, entangling government in religion to 
the extent of violating the establishment clause. 
More helpfully, Prenkert and Magid's model recom-
mends disentangling charges of disparate treatment from 
religious accommodation. They note that the "notion of 
neutrality toward religion, which is the hallmark and 
goal of disparate treatment, is present in situations call-
ing for accommodation. As a result, it remains important 
to keep the two claims distinct" (Prenkert and Magid 
2006:5lO). In situations calling for accommodation, the 
religion-neutral, generally applicable work rule or policy 
conflicts with the employee's religious belief, practice, 
or observance. Exempting the employee from the rule or 
policy will not be religion-neutral, as Justice Marshall 
also noted in his dissent to TWA v. Hardison. When dis-
parate treatment is conflated with religious accommoda-
tion, the effect is to undermine the reasoning in support 
of accommodation. The Supreme Court, in its 1990 
Smith decision, ruled that the free-exercise clause does 
not require the granting of religious exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. This reasoning implies the 
same principle for workplace accommodation: neither are 
employers required to exempt employees from generally 
applicable workplace rules or policies. However, there is 
one area of discrimination law in which accommodation 
is regarded as necessary to equality in the workplace 
rather than being regarded as special or disparate treat-
ment. In this regard, accommodation within the context 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides a 
useful comparison. 
Christine Jolls has argued that the disparate impact li-
ability under Title VII overlaps with accommodation un-
der ADA, because contrary to disparate treatment claims, 
disparate impact "occurs when employers rely on facially 
neutral practices that cause disproportionate harm to a 
particular group of employees and are not justified by 
job relatedness and business necessity" (Jolls 2001:647). 
There is a clear similarity between the two types of claim 
in that the policy at issue is neutral and claimants need not 
demonstrate intent to discriminate. However, a crucial 
difference remains: 
The standard judicial remedy in a Title VII 
disparate impact case requires the employer to 
change the policy or standard for everybody, 
not just the protected group .... By contrast, 
a successful ADA reasonable accommodation 
case requires the employer to take special steps 
to [benefit] a particular group, but not for ev-
erybody. (Schwab and Willborn 2003:1238) 
The accommodation requirement in ADA places greater 
burdens on employers than does the accommodation 
requirement under Title VII. As Schwab and Willborn 
(2003) observe: 
Under Title VII's disparate impact doctrine, 
the courts explicitly look for economic costs. 
If found, the analysis ends and the employer 
wins .... The ADA, at its core, requires em-
ployers to absorb these costs unless they are 
unreasonable or create an undue hardship; Title 
VII, at its core, avoids imposing these costs on 
employers. (1246) 
To achieve its goal of integrating persons with disabilities 
as full participants in the workforce and the society, the 
ADA acts as an affirmative action policy, requiring em-
ployers to treat qualified employees with disabilities more 
favorably than others, even if they cost more to employ 
or are less productive (Schwab and Willborn 2003:1204). 
Title VII seeks to eliminate bias against individuals based 
on characteristics such as race, sex, religion, national ori-
gin, or other characteristics that are deemed irrelevant to 
employment, but not to function as affirmative action for 
individuals from those groups. 
Even though the ADA statute mimics the language 
of Title VII regarding "reasonable accommodation" and 
"undue hardship," the standards for accommodation of 
disabled persons are quite different from the standards 
for accommodation based on religion. As Schoenbaum 
explains, both statutes prohibit employers from making 
adverse decisions about employment based on a prospec-
tive employee's disabilities or protected traits. This prohi-
bition is defensible as a means to prevent discrimination 
in the hiring process, but it obstructs accommodation 
once the person is employed: 
The limitations on preemployment inquiries 
construct who the applicant is to the employer, 
determining which characteristics are relevant 
to the employment relationship and which 
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
8 
are relegated to the realm of the personal. 
Removing these facets of people's lives from 
consideration creates a very particular vision 
of the model employee-white, male, straight, 
middle-class, not primary caregiver, not dis-
abled, of an unobtrusive religious faith, speak-
ing English as a primary language-because 
these are the default traits that are assumed to 
fit the structure of the overwhelming majority 
of American workplaces today. (Schoenbaum 
2007:120) 
The prohibition on preemployment inquiries is supposed 
to foster impartiality, but in practice it may "disguise 
how the particularized views of dominant groups appear 
universal" and make accommodation requests "appear 
as particularized claims for special interests rather than 
elements that have been ignored by the supposedly neu-
tral standard" (Schoenbaum 2007:122). In this regard, an 
advantage of the ADA standards for reasonable accom-
modation is that after the hiring decision, the ADA reaf-
firms the relevance of the person's trait-disability-to 
the employment relationship "by requiring employers to 
accommodate employees' traits that fall outside the ste-
reotype of the model employee" (Schoenbaum 2007:141). 
The ADA defines employment discrimination as, among 
other things, a failure to make "reasonable accommoda-
tions to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability" (quoted 
in Emens 2008:877). Title VII, of course, also prohibits 
discrimination based on religion, using botl1 a similar 
structure and similar language to the ADA statute. But 
because of the Court's expansive rendering of "undue 
hardship" for employers under Title VII, in practice the 
ADA accomplishes what Title VII does not-it makes 
clear that accommodation is essential to achieving the 
goal of equality within the workplace rather than constru-
ing accommodation as special treatment for a particular 
group of employees. 
As was discussed earlier in the case background 
section, JBS Swift and Company was prepared to make 
a reasonable accommodation to the plant's Muslim 
employees, but the agreement was abandoned due to a 
backlash from other plant employees who regarded the 
accommodation as special treatment for the Muslim 
employees. The consequences of the other employees' 
opposition to the accommodation created hardship for 
the plant; the accommodation itself did not. Thus it is 
important to understand how the religious accommoda-
tion issue was perceived in the local community. The 
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following section provides some empirical information 
on these matters. 
NEWS FRAMING AND PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT 
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION 
Local News Coverage of the Controversy 
Because the primary obstacle to religious accom-
modation for the Muslim workers at the Grand Island 
plant was opposition to the accommodation from non-
Muslims, it is important to understand how the contro-
versy was covered in the local press. Perceptions about 
issues are shaped by the manner in which information 
about the issues is framed. Local news reporting gives us 
a systematic means of examining how information about 
the controversy was framed within the Grand Island com-
munity. 
The data reported in this section consist of content 
analyses of the news articles and editorials about the JBS 
Swift and Company Grand Island plant controversy that 
were published in the sole local newspaper, the Grand Is-
land Independent. The articles were located on the Grand 
Island Independent website, which contains a searchable 
archive. A search was conducted using the terms "JBS 
Swift Muslim," which returned 19 valid articles. (Dupli-
cate articles from later editions, letters to the editor, and 
articles in which the plant controversy was not the focus 
were eliminated from analysis, though letters to the editor 
were examined separately for insights into how the public 
responded to this news coverage-see below.) 
Each article was coded for the presence or absence 
of particular content: (1) an explanation of the require-
ments for religious accommodation under Title VII; (2) 
an explanation of the religious observances required of 
practicing Muslims during Ramadan; (3) claims about 
hardship to the plant from providing religious accom-
modation to Muslim workers; (4) characterization of 
the accommodation agreement as inequitable to other 
employees; (5) characterization of the controversy as an 
interracial or interreligious conflict; and (6) connection of 
the controversy to immigration raids on the meatpacking 
industry. 
Only one article (5%) provided an explanation of the 
requirements for religious accommodation under Title 
VII. The absence ofthis content from the immense major-
ity of the articles suggests that religious accommodation 
for the Muslim workers was not framed as a legal obliga-
tion for the plant. The community may have been more 
supportive of religious accommodation for the Muslim 
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workers if it had been better informed of the federal law 
that prompted the request for accommodation from the 
Muslim employees and the attempted agreement negoti-
ated by the plant management and the workers' union. 
Less than one-third (32%) of the articles provided an 
explanation ofthe religious observances required ofprac-
ticing Muslims during Ramadan. The community may 
have been more supportive of religious accommodation 
for the Muslim workers if they had been better informed 
of the religious significance of Ramadan to Muslims and 
of the reasons why the Muslims needed to pray and to 
end their fasting at sunset, rather than later in the evening 
at the time the dinner break was usually scheduled. By 
contrast, nearly two-thirds (63%) of the articles included 
claims about hardship to the plant from providing reli-
gious accommodation to Muslim workers. These results 
demonstrate that the local news coverage of the contro-
versy was not balanced; the coverage favored reasons to 
oppose the accommodation over reasons to support it. 
A majority (53%) of articles characterized the accom-
modation agreement as inequitable to other employees 
at the plant. This framing reinforced the idea that the 
religious accommodation amounted to favoritism of the 
Muslim employees. The value of majoritarianism was 
elevated over the value of religious pluralism. 
Slightly less than a majority (47%) of articles framed 
the controversy as an interracial or interreligious con-
flict. It was more common for articles to identify the 
counterprotesters simply as "non-Muslims" rather than 
to describe the counterprotesters as well as the workers 
seeking religious accommodation in racial or religious 
terms. While this characterization seems defensible for 
the purpose of brevity, a simplifying descriptor of a group 
that was both racially and religiously diverse, the effect 
of this framing is also to elevate the value of majoritari-
anism. If both groups involved are described in religious 
and/or racial terms, then the reader is primed to evaluate 
the controversy in the context of pluralism. But when only 
one group is described in religious or racial terms, the 
reader is primed to evaluate the controversy in the context 
of majoritarianism-it's "us" versus "them." 
Only one article (5%) in the Grand Island Independent 
connected the controversy at the plant to immigration 
raids on the meatpacking industry. And in that article, 
the only connection was through a claim from one of the 
striking workers, who was quoted as saying that plant 
management had used immigration status to try to silence 
some of the Latino counterprotesters (Overstreet 2008). 
In coverage that the Grand Island controversy received 
from news outlets outside the local community, the im-
migration frame was more common. An Omaha World-
Herald article included immigration in a list of the factors 
complicating the controversy: "religion, culture clashes, 
refugee resettlement, immigration, union contracts, and 
factory demands in an increasingly diverse American 
work force" (Burbach 2008). And aNew York Times story 
also gave the immigration frame prominence in its cover-
age, starting with its headline ''A Somali Influx Unsettles 
Latino Meatpackers." The article's central message is en-
capsulated in this quotation: "But the dispute peeled back 
a layer of civility in this southern Nebraska city of 47,000, 
revealing slow-burning racial and ethnic tensions that 
have been an unexpected aftermath of the enforcement 
raids at workplaces by federal immigration authorities" 
(Semple 2008). Here we see that the nonlocal coverage 
framed the controversy as an interracial conflict between 
Somalis and Latinos and identified the immigration raids 
aimed at Latino workers as a precipitating cause. 
It is uncertain why the local paper's coverage es-
chewed the immigration frame. But opposition to illegal 
immigration is prevalent in Republican-dominated areas 
ofthe country such as Nebraska: A Pew Research Center 
national survey from March 2006 showed that Republi-
cans were substantially less likely than Democrats to say 
that illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the 
United States permanently (Pew Research Center 2006). 
Considering this opposition, it is likely that the use of 
an immigration frame would have made the public less 
sympathetic toward the Latinos' side in the controversy 
and thus possibly more sympathetic toward the Somalis' 
side. 
We wish to be clear that the preceding analysis makes 
no claims about the reporters' or editors' intentions in 
covering this controversy. We observe the patterns in the 
coverage and find their messages to be skewed against 
religious accommodation, but this bias is likely to be 
unintentional. The conventions of news reporting may 
lead to interpretations and constructions that appear so 
natural that they are invisible to the reporters themselves 
(Edelman 1988). 
Public Opinion about Muslims and Religious 
Accommodation 
The Pew Research Center's annual Religion and Pub-
lic Life Survey demonstrates that the non-Muslim public 
tends to see Islam as different from their own beliefs (Pew 
Research Center 2009). Sixty-five percent of the respon-
dents not affiliated with Islam described Islam as very 
or somewhat different from their own beliefs. And those 
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who regarded Islam as different from their own beliefs 
were also more likely to say that they had an unfavorable 
view of Muslims. Sixty-five percent of those who thought 
Islam was similar to their own religion reported a favor-
able view of Muslims; among those who thought Islam 
was different from their own religion, only 37% were 
favorable toward Muslims. 
Though the respondents were able to offer opinions 
as to the similarity or difference of Islam to their own 
religion, the public's level of knowledge about Islam is not 
high. Only slight majorities of respondents (53% and 52%, 
respectively) were able to answer correctly that Allah is 
the name Muslims use for God or that the Koran is the 
Islamic equivalent to the Bible, and less than a majority 
(41%) answered both questions correctly (Pew Research 
Center 2009). These data illustrate why it would have 
been important for the local news coverage to provide 
readers with information about Ramadan, its required 
observances, and its significance to practicing Muslims. 
It is clear that the mass public has a limited understanding 
of Islam. 
Letters to the editor published by the local newspaper 
give us a systematic means of examining public percep-
tions of the controversy within the Grand Island commu-
nity. The data reported in this section consist of content 
analyses of letters to the editor that were published in 
the Grand Island Independent. Three letters directly ad-
dressed the JBS Swift and Company controversy, and all 
three took positions opposed to the religious accommoda-
tion for Muslim workers. One characterized the Muslim 
workers as "trying to impose their religion" on others, 
and while the letter writer praised the Muslim workers for 
their strong beliefs, he also asserted that "Catholics, Jews, 
Evangelicals, Seventh Day Adventists," and any other 
religious groups' adherents do not expect to "just stop 
[their work] at a specified time to pray" (Letter 2008b). 
Another queried: "Didn't these people know the working 
hours of Swift when they accepted employment?" (Let-
ter 2007). And he wondered whether Swift allowed its 
employees who are adherents of other religions "to take 
time off to practice their various rituals and rites." These 
letters reflect the framing of the Independent's news 
coverage of the controversy, emphasizing hardship to the 
plant and characterizing any religious accommodation 
as favoritism for the Muslim workers and inequitable to 
other workers. Another letter writer described herself as 
"disgusted" with the actions of the Somali protesters at 
JBS Swift, questioning their claims of requiring special 
religious accommodation ("Muslims do not have a specif-
ic time to pray"), the sincerity of their religious faith, and 
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their loyalty to the company (Letter 2008a). This writer 
praised other Muslims at the plant ("both Arabic and 
European") and described Islam as a "peaceful religion," 
but she strongly condemned the Somali workers and their 
requests for religious accommodation. 
Perhaps this controversy did not capture the attention 
of the broader community enough to motivate extensive 
letter-writing or other widespread demonstrations of 
community opinion. But those few who were motivated 
to write were all clearly opposed to JBS Swift providing 
a religious accommodation to its Muslim employees. In 
this regard, the community opinion is consistent with 
the opposition expressed by the JBS Swift and Company 
plant employees whose counterprotests forced manage-
ment to rescind its offer of religious accommodation. It 
is clear that they regarded religious accommodation as 
special treatment or favoritism toward the Muslim em-
ployees rather than a means of achieving equality in the 
workplace for employees who were particularly harmed 
by the later timing of the B-shift's dinner break. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, EFFICIENCY, AND 
VALUES 
The tension apparent in religious accommodation 
cases is between economic efficiency and the protection 
of a fundamental right. In a simple and homogeneous 
community, this tension may be easily resolved. In a 
complicated and diverse community, matters are not so 
easy. As Laurence Tribe has noted, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has increasingly adopted a utilitarian approach 
that tends to favor economic efficiency (Tribe 1985). The 
Court's interpretations of the reasonableness and undue 
hardship standards under Title VII reflect this approach. 
But as Tribe argues, utilitarian jurisprudence effectively 
undermines the purpose of judicial review, a written 
constitution, and particularly an articulation of funda-
mental rights: "That purpose, of course, is to ensure that 
certain principles will not be sacrificed to expediency" 
(Tribe 1985:613). Even when a religious accommodation 
results, the process of attempting to weigh on a common 
metric the hardship on the employer in comparison to 
the employee's sincerity of religious belief, practice, or 
observance seems to slight the very idea of fundamental 
rights. As Tribe explains: 
Being "assigned" a right on efficiency grounds, 
after an appraisal of the relevant cost curves, 
hardly satisfies the particular human need that 
can be met only by a shared social and legal 
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understanding that the right belongs to the in-
dividual because the capacity and opportunity 
it embodies are organically and historically a 
part of the person that she is, and not for any 
purely contingent and essentially managerial 
reason. (Tribe 1985:596, emphasis in original) 
In the JBS Swift case, the responses of the other employ-
ees at the plant as well as the community (as represented 
by the news framing and letters to the editor) demon-
strate the lack of a shared social understanding that a 
right to free exercise of religion is essential, a problem 
compounded by what Tribe terms "the inadequacy of 
technocratic jurisprudence" (599). 
Laurence Tribe's framework would require consti-
tutional interpretation from judges cognizant of their 
constitutive role: "[C]onstitutional choices affect, and 
hence require consideration of, the way in which a polity 
wishes to constitute itself. In making such choices, we re-
affirm and create, select and shape, the values and truths 
we hold sacred" (Tribe 1985:595, emphasis in original). 
But this role for the courts is not embraced by all. As 
any observer of judicial politics in the United States will 
recognize, constitutional scholars and judges themselves 
have varying perspectives on the proper approaches to 
constitutional interpretation and on the proper responsi-
bilities of the courts relative to other political actors. The 
framework espoused by Tribe is challenged by others, 
notably Frank Easterbrook. 
In his reply to Tribe, Frank Easterbrook argues 
that "we get nowhere by listing values unless we have 
both a metric by which to assess the claims the parties 
make and a legitimate rule of decision" (Easterbrook 
1985:626). According to Easterbrook, the benefit of 
economic analysis, even when it is incomplete, is that 
it provides information about the likely effects of the 
Court's decisions. In Easterbrook's framework, absent 
clear social consensus and/or more specific directives 
from the political branches, the judiciary lacks the au-
thority to decide to prioritize religious pluralism over 
economic efficiency. However, a utilitarian approach to 
jurisprudence is itself a decision to prioritize economic 
efficiency. Because the "costs" to employers of making 
an accommodation can be readily quantified and the 
"costs" to employees of violating their faith cannot, a 
quest for efficiency rigs the outcome against religious 
accommodation. 
The debate about how to balance economic interests 
with the protection of liberty and diversity, sketched 
here in the exchange between Lawrence Tribe and Frank 
Easterbrook, echoes across a range of issues. These are 
difficult questions, and citizens as well as lawmakers and 
scholars are confounded by the challenge of how best to 
reconcile competing goods. It is important to be cogni-
zant of the trade-offs as the search for better public policy 
continues. 
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: THE NEBRASKA EXPERIENCE 
If constitutions serve as contracts for the polity to pur-
sue its political, social, and economic rights and liberties, 
then it is appropriate to compare constitutions in order to 
determine which constitutional texts and practices may 
provide the polity with the greatest possible freedom and 
security. A.E. Dick Howard underscores the importance 
of comparative constitutionalism, particularly in the area 
of human rights: 
It is hard to imagine drafters of a new con-
stitution going about their task unconcerned 
about human rights standards .... And judges, 
wherever they come down on the uses of com-
parative data, cannot escape thinking about 
the question of whether they should look only 
to domestic sources or also to those from other 
countries or those based on international law. 
(Howard 2009:18) 
While much attention focuses on national consti-
tutions, much can also be gained by examining state 
constitutions. Indeed, elsewhere Howard emphasizes the 
theoretical importance of a state constitution: ''A state 
constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to record 
their moral values, their definition of justice, and their 
hopes for the common good. A state constitution defines 
a way oflife" (Howard 1998:14). Thus Howard's descrip-
tion of a state constitution reflects Tribe's argument that 
the constitutive function of constitutional interpretation 
must not be neglected or forgotten. Of course, it is incum-
bent upon public officials to ensure that a social contract 
so constituted includes all. One complexity of the social 
contract at the state level concerns the incorporation 
into the community of new members, particularly when 
those members increase the diversity of the community. 
As is evident in the Grand Island case, the incorporation 
of refugees from Somalia into the central Nebraskan 
community has strained tolerance for diversity. Does 
Nebraska's constitution define the good life to include 
full membership and justice for these newest members of 
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its polity? We turn now to a consideration of Nebraska's 
state constitution. 
One of the earliest constitutional cases involving reli-
gion in the state of Nebraska was State ex rei. v. Scheve 
(65 Neb. 853 [1903]). This case held that it was the duty of 
the state to "protect every religious denomination in the 
peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship" 
(878), echoing the constitutional language on religious 
freedom (Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 4 [1875]). This case un-
derscores that the Nebraska Constitution does not allow 
the state to discriminate among religions, and beyond a 
mere requirement of neutrality, the state has a duty to 
protect religious practices. Thus religious pluralism con-
stituted a feature of Nebraskans' self-definition from its 
founding, yet subsequent decisions were not so inclusive, 
particularly when the religious practices of newer resi-
dents entailed worship in another language. 
In the years that preceded World War J, citizens of the 
United States were psychologically and politically pre-
pared to respond to international events with nationalistic 
enthusiasm. Many people feared that German Americans 
suffered from divided loyalties (Gaffney 2001). Nebraska 
was no exception, and the constitutional history of Ne-
braska's language law reveals an ongoing tension over the 
treatment to be extended to new residents who persisted 
with "foreign" ways. 
In Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod 
of Missouri v. McKelvie (104 Neb. 93 [1919]), the court 
upheld Nebraska's foreign language law, which prohib-
ited the teaching of any subject in a language other than 
English and included private and parochial as well as 
public schools in the restriction (Chapter 249, Laws 1919). 
Foreign-language-speaking parents, certain church cor-
porations, and private schools requested an injunction 
to restrain enforcement of Chapter 249, Laws 1919. The 
issues of the case included the rights of parents to direct 
the religious and educational upbringing of their children. 
In addressing the underlying purpose of the law, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court stated: 
It is a matter of general public information, 
of which the court is entitled to take judicial 
knowledge, that it was disclosed that thousands 
of men born in this country of foreign language 
speaking parents and educated in schools 
taught in a foreign language were unable to 
read, write or speak the language of their 
country, or understand words of command 
given in English. It was also demonstrated that 
there was a local foci of alien enemy sentiment, 
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and that, where such instances occurred, the 
education given by private or parochial schools 
in that community was usually found to be 
that which had been given mainly in a foreign 
language. (97) 
Finding that the act was intended to address these con-
cerns, the court interpreted the language law in conjunc-
tion with the compulsory education act, Chapter 155, 
Laws 1919. That statute contained a specific provision 
stating that the act should not be construed so as to in-
terfere with religious instruction in private or parochial 
schools. As a result, the court held that the purpose of 
the language law was to abolish instruction in foreign 
language in elementary schools in subjects that were re-
quired to be taught under the law. The court determined 
that nothing in the law prohibited religious instruction 
in a foreign language, provided that such instruction did 
not interfere with the teaching of those subjects legally 
required to be taught to children. 
In narrowing the scope of the Nebraska language 
law, the court balanced the liberty interest of parents in 
directing the religious and educational upbringing of their 
children, while upholding the limitation on instruction in 
a foreign language. In so doing, cultural pluralism was 
preserved to a certain extent, while the passions of the 
citizenry were tempered. 
Meyer v. Nebraska (107 Neb. 657 [1922]) was a second 
challenge to the constitutional legitimacy ofthe Nebraska 
language law. In that case, Robert T. Meyer, a parochial 
schoolteacher, provided instruction to a student in the 
German language using a book of biblical stories. Meyer 
asserted that German language instruction was necessary 
for children to understand and practice the religion of 
their parents. In finding Meyer guilty, the opinion of the 
court provides a glimpse into the popular sentiment that 
prevailed during the era: 
The legislature had seen the baneful effects of 
permitting foreigners, who had taken residence 
in this country, to rear and educate their children 
in the language of their native land. The result 
of that condition was found to be inimical to our 
own safety. To allow the children of foreigners, 
who had emigrated here, to be taught from early 
childhood the language of the country of their 
parents was to rear them with that language as 
their mother tongue. It was to educate them so 
that ... [their] sentiments [are] foreign to the best 
interests of this country. (661-62) 
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Drawing a distinction between religiously motivated con-
duct and religious beliefs, the court determined that the 
legislation was constitutional, finding that the burden on 
religious conduct was outweighed by the governmental 
purpose espoused by the statute. 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court repudiated the 
Nebraska legislation limiting instruction in a foreign 
language (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 [1923]). The 
Court noted that parental rights and religious liberty were 
included within the purview of the 14th Amendment. Lib-
erty interests included within the 14th Amendment could 
not be infringed by legislative action that was arbitrary 
or without reasonable relation to a legitimate state inter-
est. Recognizing the legislative purpose of the Nebraska 
language law, the Court stated: 
That the state may do much, go very far, in-
deed, in order to improve the quality of its 
citizens . . . is clear; but the individual has 
certain fundamental rights which must be 
respected .... [A] desirable end cannot be 
promoted by prohibited means .... The desire 
of the legislature to foster a homogeneous 
people with American ideals prepared readily 
to understand current discussions of civic mat-
ters is easy to appreciate. . . . But the means 
adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon 
the power of the State and conflict with rights 
assured to plaintiff in error. (401-2) 
The state government's decisions regarding Nebraska's 
language law serve as a reminder that state government 
is not always the best venue for a jurisprudence accept-
ing of diversity. Local passions were eventually tempered 
by federal institutions, consistent with the constitutional 
framework originally designed by the framers. Yet ele-
ments of Nebraska's constitutionalism do offer the prom-
ise of inclusivity with respect to religion. 
Despite the restrictive applications of the Nebraska 
language law, Nebraska's constitution is unusually ex-
pansive in its protection of religion. The Nebraska Con-
stitution states an affirmative duty to protect religion: "It 
shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws 
to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable 
enjoyment of its own public worship and to encourage 
schools and the means of instruction" (Neb. Const. art. I, 
sec. 4 [1875]). This passage provides a normative dimen-
sion favorable to religious pluralism. As Calabresi and 
Agudo (2008:40) noted, Nebraska's state constitution (as 
well as those of Texas and Ohio, which contain similar 
provisions) is distinctive: 
These clauses are noteworthy because they 
provide for a positive duty on government 
to foster religious free exercise, rather than 
producing only a negative bar on government 
interferences with religious free exercise. 
These clauses also protect the freedom of wor-
ship, which may involve action, and not simply 
freedom of conscience or belief. 
Nebraska's current constitutional structure offers a 
blueprint for securing religious pluralism and extend-
ing religious liberty protections even to those, such 
as the Muslim employees of JBS Swift and Company, 
whose requirements for worship do not mesh well with 
the established practices and routines of the majority. 
If public worship for Muslims during the month ofRa-
madan requires that worshippers daily break their fast 
and pray at or near sunset, and if adjusting the timing of 
dinner breaks to near sunset does not interfere with the 
religious worship of other employees, protection for the 
worship of Muslims may require that an accommoda-
tion be made. Since the Nebraska Constitution lays a 
duty on the legislature to pass legislation that protects 
the freedom of worship for all religions, the legislature 
could mandate greater religious accommodation than 
is available to employees under Title VII, provided that 
it takes care not to offend against the Lemon Test for 
establishment of religion. The Nebraska Constitution 
provides a basis to promote religious accommodation 
as essential to the achievement of equality within Ne-
braska's workplaces. 
The language in article I, section 4, of Nebraska's 
constitution, laying a duty on the legislature to "encour-
age schools and the means of instruction," was used in a 
recent case to argue that the state constitution provides 
for a right to adequate education-the religious aspect 
of the section was not raised. In Nebraska Coalition for 
Education Equity and Adequacy v. Heineman (273 Neb. 
531 [2007]), the court concluded that the question was not 
justiciable, because there was no clear standard for de-
termining what an adequate education is (Miewald et al. 
2009:56). Should a case be brought to argue the religious 
aspects ofthe section, the court could do likewise and find 
the question to be nonjusticiable as a political question, or 
perhaps the court would order the legislature to fulfill its 
constitutionalIy prescribed duty to protect religion. 
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FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As the matter stands, the Muslim employees of JBS 
Swift and Company in Grand Island, NE, have not been 
able to secure accommodation for their religious require-
ment to pray and break their fast at sunset during their 
holy month of Ramadan. The plant management and the 
workers' union was willing to make the accommoda-
tion, whether motivated by a commitment to the value 
of religious pluralism or, more likely, a desire to retain 
workers in a competitive industry that suffers from labor 
shortages. The religious accommodation was derailed by 
opposition from other plant workers and by federal poli-
cies that prioritize economic efficiency and majoritarian 
interests. 
Individual and societal acceptance of diversity is often 
difficult to secure, as was witnessed in this case through 
local news coverage that framed the issue in terms of 
hardship to the plant and inequitable treatment of other 
workers, giving its readers reasons to oppose religious 
accommodation, a perspective echoed in the letters to 
the editor on the controversy. And while local passions 
ought to be tempered by federal institutions, consistent 
with the constitutional framework originally designed 
by the framers, the U.S. Supreme Court's inclination 
toward a utilitarian approach and the absence of stronger 
legislative direction on religious accommodations under 
. Title VII make relief through appeals to federal authority 
unlikely. 
Federal institutions have often served to control po-
tential shortcomings of state constitutionalism, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court did in the Meyer case. However, 
Nebraska's state constitution includes the legislative duty 
to protect religion, a stronger potential means of securing 
religious liberty than is provided by the federal constitu-
tion, subject of course to the legislature's fulfillment of 
this duty. Thus Muslims in Nebraska might fare better 
in seeking protections for their religious liberty in state 
venues. Although a federal structure is not a cure-all for 
tyranny of the majority, federalism is a structural means 
to limit government power and protect individual rights. 
At times, the protection is obtained by guaranteeing the 
uniformity of laws across the states, removing issues 
from the purview of state governments, when the states 
would be inclined to discriminate. At other times, the pro-
tection is obtained by devolving authority to the states and 
allowing the states to adopt more expansive protections 
for rights than are provided by the national government. 
Nebraska's affirmative duty to protect religion holds the 
promise of religious liberty for recent immigrants from 
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Somalia. What remains is a reaffirmation of the commu-
nity's commitment to religious pluralism as a feature of 
the definition of Nebraska's good life. Other states could 
benefit from a comparison to the constitutional workings 
of Nebraska so as to ensure religious liberty protections 
for the newest residents of the Great Plains and beyond. 
ADDENDUM 
As this article was going to press, there was a new 
development in the Grand Island meatpacking plant 
controversy that served as our case study. On August 31, 
2010, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (E.E.O.C.) filed lawsuits in federal court against 
JBS Swift & Company's Grand Island, Nebraska, meat-
packing plant as well as the company's plant in Greeley, 
Colorado. The suits allege that JBS Swift violated Title 
VII and engaged in a pattern of discrimination against its 
Somali Muslim employees based on their religion, race, 
and national origin. The E.E.O.C.'s complaint asserts that 
JBS Swift failed to reasonably accommodate the requests 
of the Muslim employees to take breaks from work that 
would permit them to pray according to the requirements 
oftheir faith and that the company retaliated against some 
Muslim employees by terminating their employment 
when they protested the lack of religious accommoda-
tion. In a press release, the E.E.O.C. reported that it had 
received 85 charges filed by employees of the Grand Is-
land plant that claimed discrimination based on religion, 
race, color, or national origin stemming from the 2008 
controversy (retrieved from http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/ 
newsroom/release/8-31-IO.cfm). The lawsuit filed against 
JBS Swift was the result of investigations of these charges 
conducted by the E.E.O.C. and the Nebraska Equal Op-
portunity Commission. The lawsuit now is pending in the 
U.S. District Court in Omaha. How the court will rule in 
the case is still uncertain. The case is EEOC v. JBS USA, 
LLC d/b/a JBS Swift & Company (D. Neb.). 
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HUMA ALLIANCE 
Timothy R. Mahoney, Project Administrator 
Digital Research Projects 
from the Plains Humanities Alliance, 
Center for Great Plains Studies, 
and the Center for Digital Research in the Humanities, 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
• Gilded Age Plains City: The Great Sheedy Murder Trial 
and the Booster Ethos of Lincoln, Nebraska 
Project Director: Timothy R. Mahoney, Professor of History, 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
http://gildedage.unl.edu 
• Army Officers' Wives on the Great Plains, 1865-1900 
Project Director: Barbara Handy-Marchello, Professor Emerita 
of History, University of North Dakota 
http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/projects/army _officers _ wives/ 
• The Home Front in the Great Plains during World War II, 
1939-1945 
Project Director: R. Douglas Hurt, Professor of History, Purdue 
University 
http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/homefront/ 
• Elia Peattie: An Uncommon Writer, An Uncommon Woman 
Project Director: Susanne George Bloomfield, Professor of 
English, University of Nebraska at Kearney 
http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/peattie/ 
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